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Felix Frankfurter once remarked, "Chief Justices of the 
United States are rarer than Presidents. A Chief Justice cannot 
escape history."3 Since this observation appeared in an encomium 
to Harlan Fiske Stone, its sentiment may have been more appro-
priate than its substance is true. The fact is that chief justices' 
names-John Marshall's excepted, of course-go down in history 
more as labels for the Courts over which they presided than be-
cause of the personal contributions they may have made to consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Except for Marshall, none of the fifteen 
chief justices was the dominant figure on the Court over which he 
presided. (Strong as he was, Charles Evans Hughes was not the 
leader of the Court of his period.) It must be remembered that the 
"authors" of Supreme Court opinions purport to express the views 
of the majority, not merely their own. The style of an opinion is 
idiosyncratic, but its substance is syncretic. 
If, however, the judgment of history is to be found in the bur-
geoning literary genre of judicial biography, it may be that chief 
justices dominate. Like most biographies, judicial biographies 
tend to be paeans to their subjects. They exalt their protagonists' 
virtues, ignore their failings, and exaggerate their influence. Dis-
interestedness is as rare among biographers of judges as it is now 
rare in the work of the jurists themselves. 
The subjects of this book, Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter, 
possessed much stronger intellects than either Fred Vinson or Earl 
Warren, and were certainly the peers of Hughes and Stone. If it 
cannot be said that they controlled the decisions of their Courts, it 
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can be said with little doubt that they were largely responsible for 
the framing of the issues that their Courts addressed. 
It has been wisely said that: 
The qualities that make for greatness in judges are elusive and the subject of 
debate. One thing that is certain is that there is no strong correlation between 
judicial eminence and the ability to win support from colleagues on the bench; on 
the contrary, many of the ablest and most renowned judges are frequent dissent-
ers. Usually the great judge's impact on law is a long-range one because he is an 
innovator challenging the legal status quo.4 
There is, however, one consistent if not sufficient condition for en-
try into the judicial hall of fame and that is longevity of service. 
Both Black and Frankfurter were among the long-tenured justices 
of the high court. 
There is judicial biography in this volume, but there are no 
signs of hagiography. The first half of the book is devoted to two 
essays describing the pre-judicial lives, first of Frankfurter and 
then of Black. Remarkably for this day, the author eschews the 
pseudoscientific psychoanalytic approaches that have so recently 
flooded the literature, although he is careful not to denigrate such 
an approach.s Equally rare is Silverstein's avoidance of the gossip 
and sensationalism ofpseudoscholars who would rather be Wood-
ward and Armstrong than academics. Intellectual analysis rather 
than ideological commitmevt marks the work and makes it inter-
esting and informative. The book is not summertime hammock 
reading to titillate the uninformed. It is a serious work for serious 
students. This does not mean that it is a pedant's product. If it 
still bears some of the stigmata of a doctoral dissertation, it re-
mains remarkably good reading that is not dependent on the 
scholarly paraphernalia for its cogency. 
The essential question addressed is how the democratic faiths 
of the two justices were tested in the creation and application of 
constitutional values in the course of adjudication. Both justices 
were deeply committed to a faith in democracy, but they were 
members, so to speak, of different sects of that faith. Of Frank-
furter, Silverstein perceptively tells us: 
Thus by the eve of his appointment to the Court, Frankfurter had a clearly 
established, idealized political picture of American democracy. Firm in his belief 
that politics was a continual process of education, he refused to justify the state as 
merely a referee presiding over the clash of partisan interests and groups, rather, 
it was a harmonious machine, powered by a faith in education and the public 
interest, slowly progressing toward co=only held goals. At the very center of 
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his democratic faith was a confidence in the average citizen's ability, given the 
right leadership, to forsake individual interests and to sanction, through the demo-
cratic process, action in furtherance of the public interest. 6 
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If Frankfurter's political experiences can be said to have been 
at the general staff level as confidant of governors and cabinet of-
ficers and even presidents, Hugo Black's were clearly on the line: 
at the hustings, within the Democratic party in Alabama, and later 
in the United States Senate. If political party was irrelevant to 
Frankfurter's conception of democratic reform, for Black only the 
Democrats were the vehicle to this end. In Silverstein's words: 
To develop from that Jeffersonian tradition a theory of the use of power to com-
bat private power was the dilemma common to American reformers at the tum of 
the twentieth century .... 
Before his appointment to the Coun, Black, unlike Frankfurter, never devel-
oped a coherent theory to justify the use of public power as a means of re-
form. . . . Confined by a political understanding that would not permit a third 
party movement, Black's reform instincts were limited by the realities of the 
Democratic party. 
Although Black increasingly viewed Congress as the means by which polit-
ical power could be employed on behalf of the many, he had a consistent distrust 
of the use of power that Frankfurter lacked. Frankfurter fashioned a political 
theory that appeared to satisfy his democratic faith and realities of the political 
world. Although Black had a clearly developed understanding of the polity, 
before his appointment to the Court he was unable to formulate a coherent polit-
ical theory based upon that political vision. Black's ideal state-strong enough to 
control private concentrations of power but not strong enough to destroy personal 
freedom-reflects his ambiguity about power. Ultimately Black feared both pri-
vate power and the growth of public power. It was the continuing, unresolved 
ambiguity concerning private and public power that was to mark his initial years 
on the bench. 7 
Of course, these synopses are oversimplifications. Both jus-
tices were sophisticated. They were prepared to grant more lee-
way to conglomerates of labor than to conglomerates of capital. 
Black was more truly the Jeffersonian in his respect for federalism 
than was Frankfurter and so, too, was he more dubious about con-
centration of power in the executive. The legislature was, for him, 
the democratic branch of government, and in democracy was to 
be found our salvation. 
The two democratic faiths were to be tested again and again 
in the work of the Court. To reconcile judicial review with demo-
cratic principles required constant adjustments of beliefs: judicial 
review is not reconcilable with democratic concepts of self-gov-
ernment. Judicial review is a restraint on democracy, imposed by 
a politically irresponsible judiciary, unelected, irremovable, and 
6. /d. at 88. The italics are mine, but the emphasis is Silverstein's and is pervasive. 
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independent because otherwise the restraints of the Constitution 
could become meaningless. 
The second part of the book is devoted to measuring Black's 
and Frankfurter's democratic faiths as they were displayed in 
some of the important areas of constitutional law during their 
joint tenure. The comparative technique proves a fruitful one. It 
has been essayed once before with the same principals and pretty 
much the same issues in Professor Wallace Mendelson's 1961 
book Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict on the Court. But 
the objective there was different. Mendelson sought to show that 
Frankfurter was right and Black was wrong. Silverstein attempts 
no such Jovian perspective. He credits the good faith of both ju-
rists and tries to reveal how each justice's principles led him to his 
results. He does not expect, nor does he find, the kind of consis-
tency that a true ideology would have dictated. But neither of the 
subjects was a rigid ideologue in the European sense. And Silver-
stein perceives what so many political scientists do not: "Despite 
frequent scholarly attempts to study judges in a manner similar to 
the study of other political actors, judges are different and studies 
of judicial behavior must account for their differences."s 
Black and Frankfurter were antagonists, but they respected 
each other and respected the limitations of their office. Thus, they 
were joined in a way that separated them from a justice like Wil-
liam 0. Douglas. In voting behavior, Douglas and Black were 
often allied against Frankfurter. But Douglas did not share 
Black's notion of the limited nature of the judicial power and he 
frequently questioned the good faith of those with whom he 
disagreed. 
Silverstein's conclusion is worth quotation: 
The American judicial tradition is marked by ambiguity. Principally this is the 
case because we are a nation that is at once liberal and democratic, and we expect 
judges to be faithful to both traditions. It is, perhaps, an unrealistic expectation, 
and thus it is hardly surprising that after two hundred years the judiciary is still a 
subject of intense controversy and debate. In the final analysis, the judicial role 
remains ambiguous for judge and citizen alike. 
Frankfurter and Black are symbolic of that tradition. Fearful of judicial tyr-
anny, each sought in highly developed role orientations with roots deep in Ameri-
can political and social thought the means to ensure disinterested decision 
making. Each continually sought to harmonize judicial review with its demo-
cratic setting, and each strove to remove from the judicial process the vagaries of 
personal preference. Each ultimately was guided in his task by a single-minded 
devotion to the Constitution and the ideal of the rule oflaw.9 
8. Id at 208. 
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This book is different from most judicial studies that we have 
been getting. You don't have to accept the author's conclusions. 
But certainly he has adduced strong evidence in support of them. 
And if you are tired of tirades, glutted with gossip, sick of syco-
phancy, here is some plain talk by an author who seems to know 
what he is talking about. 
Although Black was often remiss in adhering to his "strict" readings of the due process and 
equal protection clauses, Frankfurter's willingness to treat them as open-ended incorpora-
tions of the sounder values of our civilization brought with it an enormous authority for the 
judiciary. On the other hand, I suppose that "the ideal of the rule of law" was more in 
keeping with Frankfurter's jurisprudence than Black's. 
